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Abstract
We study equilibria of markets with m heterogeneous indivisible goods and n consumers with
combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist
when valuations are not gross substitutes. Given the widespread use of bundling in real-life markets,
we study its role as a stabilizing and coordinating device by considering the notion of competitive
bundling equilibrium: a competitive equilibrium over the market induced by partitioning the goods
for sale into fixed bundles. Compared to other equilibrium concepts involving bundles, this notion
has the advantage of simulatneous succinctness (O(m) prices) and market clearance.
Our first set of results concern welfare guarantees. We show that in markets where consumers
care only about the number of goods they receive (known as multi-unit or homogeneous markets),
even in the presence of complementarities, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium
that guarantees a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. We also
establish non-trivial welfare guarantees for general markets, two-consumer markets, and markets
where the consumer valuations are additive up to a fixed budget (budget-additive).
Our second set of results concern revenue guarantees. Motivated by the fact that the revenue
extracted in a standard competitive equilibrium may be zero (even with simple unit-demand con-
sumers), we show that for natural subclasses of gross substitutes valuations, there always exists a
competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and
this guarantee is tight. The notion of competitive bundling equilibrium can thus be useful even in
markets which possess a standard competitive equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Competitive equilibria play a fundamental role in market theory and design – they capture the market’s
steady states, in which each participant maximizes his profit at equilibrium prices, and supply equals
demand. In this paper we focus on single-seller combinatorial markets, which consist of a set M of m
heterogeneous goods, and a set N of n consumers. Each consumer i has a valuation vi : 2
M → R+ over
bundles of goods. The standard assumptions are that each vi is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone
non-decreasing. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium is simply an allocation of the goods to the
consumers, denoted by (S1, . . . , Sn), and supporting item prices, denoted by pj for good j, such that:
∗We are grateful to Paul Milgrom, David Parkes and Tim Roughgarden for helpful discussions. Part of this work
was done while authors 2-4 were visiting Microsoft Research Herzliya, Israel. I. Talgam-Cohen is supported by the Hsieh
Family Stanford Interdisciplinary Graduate Fellowship. O. Weinstein is supported by the Simons Fellowship in Theoretical
Computer Science.
1
1. Profit Maximization: The profit of every consumer i is maximized by his allocation Si; i.e.,
for every alternative set of goods T , vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
pj ≥ vi(T )−
∑
j∈T pj.
2. Market Clearance: All items are allocated; i.e.,
⋃
i Si =M .
Unfortunately, a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist only in limited classes of combinatorial
markets, most notably the class in which all valuations are gross substitutes1 [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999;
Milgrom, 2004].
Implicit in the definitions of a market and an equilibrium is the assumption that the goods are
exogenously determined and indivisible. Yet in many markets this is not the case, and what is being
sold on the market are actually divisible bundles of indivisible items [cf., Levin and Milgrom, 2010]. For
example, there is no inherent reason for beer to be sold in 6-packs rather than, say, 8-packs. Bundling is
ubiquitous in real-life markets: It is a well-known method for revenue extraction [Manelli and Vincent,
2006]; for instance, many airlines set the price of a round-trip to be equal to the price of a one-way
air ticket. It is also a common mean for avoiding the exposure problem related to complementarities;
for example, in the online market for concert ticket resale StubHub.com, a seller holding two tickets
may prohibit their separate resale, so that he may still enjoy the show with a friend in case there is no
demand for both tickets.
In this paper we study the role of bundling in market stabilization. Bundling introduces new equi-
libria into the market, and thus can recover stability in markets that lack a competitive equilibrium. It
can also give rise to stable states with better revenue properties. The main challenge is whether “good”
bundlings exist, i.e., those which result in (approximately) optimal social efficiency and/or revenue
extraction.
Equilibrium Concept and Related Work
There is a rich literature concerning extensions of competitive equilibrium that allow bundling.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002] study competitive equilibria over bundles supported by 2m non-
linear and non-anonymous prices per consumer, and use an LP-based approach to characterize them.
Auctions that reach such equilibria are studied by Parkes and Ungar [2000]; Ausubel and Milgrom
[2002]. Non-linear but anonymous supporting prices, as well as auctions that reach them, exist in
special cases, notably superadditive valuations [Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002; Lahaie and Parkes,
2009; Sun and Yang, 2014]. See also [Parkes, 1999; Parkes and Ungar, 2002; Parkes, 2006; Vohra,
2011].
In this paper we focus on perhaps the simplest possible extension, in which supporting prices are
linear and anonymous. A competitive bundling equilibrium consists of a partition of the goods into
bundles, denoted by B = (B1, . . . , Bm′) and referred to as a bundling, in addition to an allocation
(S1, . . . , Sn) of the bundles to the consumers , and a price pBj for each bundle Bj , such that:
1. Profit Maximization: For every consumer i and alternative set of bundles T , vi(Si)−
∑
Bj∈Si
pBj ≥
vi(T )−
∑
Bj∈T
pBj .
2. Market Clearance:
⋃
i Si =M .
(For simplicity we use here the notation vi(Si) to refer to vi(
⋃
Bj∈Si
Bj), and
⋃
i Si to refer to
⋃
i
⋃
Bj∈Si
Bj.)
Observe that unlike competitive equilibrium, a competitive bundling equilibrium always exists by
bundling all goods together, but the welfare it achieves may reach only a 1/n-fraction of the optimal
unconstrained welfare. Hence, in this paper we are mainly occupied with seeking better competitive
bundling equilibria.
1See Section 2 for a definition of gross substitutes; see [Sun and Yang, 2006; Candogan et al., 2013] for other special
cases in which a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
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Relevant to our work is a recent paper by Feldman et al. [2013], which shows that if one ignores
the market clearance requirement, there always exist a bundling and (anonymous and linear) prices
that achieve a striking 2-approximation to the optimal welfare. Their solution concept, termed com-
binatorial Walrasian equilibrium, obeys only the profit maximization requirement, and so is closer to
an algorithmic pricing solution than to a classic, supply-equals-demand equilibrium. This prompts
them to pose the following question, which we address in this paper by quantifying the effect of the
market clearance requirement: “An important question is whether our results extend to the stronger
equilibrium notion [...] with market clearance.” Despite the dissimilarities, we are able to adapt in this
paper some of the technical constructions of Feldman et al.
The market clearance problem is also considered by Feldman and Lucier [2014], but with respect
only to two restricted classes of valuations – a strict subclass of budget-additive valuations, and the
class of superaddivite valuations. For the former we provide a general treatment in Section 6. For
the latter, we re-derive their result as a corollary of a more general LP-based argument that appears
in Section 8: Parkes [1999] observes that an LP formulation introduced by Bikhchandani and Ostroy
[2002] has an integrality gap of 1 for superadditive valuations; we show that this implies the existence
of a fully-efficient competitive bundling equilibrium.
Disadvantages of Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
We stress we have no claim that competitive bundling equilibrium is a universally applicable solution
concept. In particular, it may be inappropriate in three kinds of markets:
1. Markets in which consumers are able and willing to break their bundles and resell the goods
separately – in such markets, competitive bundling equilibrium is too weak a notion to establish
stability;
2. Markets which can reach a stable state even without clearing – in such markets, competitive
bundling equilibrium is too strong a notion to capture all stable outcomes;
3. Markets in which different producers are not able to bundle their products together (reducing the
notion of competitive bundling equilibrium to the standard one of competitive equilibrium).
Like the seminal model of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002], our model assumes resale restrictions to
enforce bundling (similar to their “crates cannot be opened” condition), as well as market clearance
even in single-seller markets, and the ability to bundle items arbitrarily. However, as we now explain,
both models are relevant in a wide variety of markets despite these restrictions.
First, bundling is often legally or effectively irrevocable. The market for air tickets mentioned earlier
is one example, as are retail markets in which bundles are explicitely marked as “not for individual
sale”. Another example is markets in which the physical packaging plays a role, such as sterilized infant
products. As yet another example consider amusement park passes – Disney sells bundles of several
day passes which are activated upon first enterance, when a fingerprint is taken from the visitor; the
rest of the passes can then only be used by the same visitor.
Second, in many markets the requirement of market clearance is crucial for stability. The standard
argument is that if the market is not cleared, competing producers have an incentive to undercut
prices, leaving the market unstable [for a thorough discussion see Mas-Collel et al., 1995, Section 10.B].
Market clearance also plays a role when there is a single seller: While in some cases a monopolist can
create a stable outcome in which goods that were already produced are not sold, despite unsaturated
demand, in many other cases this would not be possible. Consider for example a governmental seller
of a scarce resource such as spectrum or land; an outcome where the government withholds unutilized
but demanded resources is unreasonable and unstable. As another example, consider a private, for-
profit seller who cannot credibly commit to withholding goods. For instance, a seller of concert tickets
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may attempt to create demand and extract more revenue by withholding half the tickets, but once
the designated tickets are sold for a high price, he has incentive to simply sell more tickets at a lower
price (say, at the door). Many consumers, in turn, would refrain from buying the high-priced tickets
in the first place. Note that even the extreme method of physically destroying retail goods as a means
of credible commitment is often impractical [see consumer backlash over practice of destroying unsold
clothing, Dwyer, 2010].
Third, bundles of goods belonging to different producers are not uncommon in practice. For exam-
ple, a travel website can offer bundles of air tickets, hotel rooms and car rental. An interesting open
question is what are the market processes leading to such bundling [cf., Hatfield et al., 2014].
Our Results
We analyze two different aspects of competitive bundling equilibria. First, the existence of approxi-
mately welfare-maximizing equilibria for several classes of well-studied valuations [for a taxonomy see,
e.g., Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007]. Next, we turn our attention to revenue guarantees: can the seller bun-
dle the goods in a way that will guarantee approximately-optimal revenue, compared to the full-welfare
benchmark? In our results, the approximation parameter2 will often depend (often logarithmically) on
the length of the market’s shorter side3 µ, where
µ = min{n,m}. (1)
Welfare Maximization
The positive results described below establish, for different settings, the existence of a competitive
bundling equilibrium with good welfare guarantees; note that by the first welfare theorem applied to
the post-bundling market, all competitive bundling equilibria with this bundling have these guarantees.
We begin our overview with multi-unit settings, i.e., markets in which all goods are identical, and
consumers’ values only depend on the number of units they receive. A classic result of Vickrey [1961]
shows that if the consumers’ valuations exhibit decreasing marginal utilities, then there always exists a
competitive equilibrium. We are able to give a complete analysis for competitive bundling equilibria in
multi-unit settings, without the assumption of decreasing marginal utilities, thus accommodating the
notorious case of markets with complements. We prove (Section 4):
Theorem: For every multi-unit market there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that provides
an O(log µ)-approximation to the optimal welfare. On the flip side, if even a single valuation is subad-
ditive rather than having decreasing marginal utilities, it may be the case that the approximation ratio
of every competitive bundling equilibrium is Ω(log µ).
The second half of the above theorem implies that even for slightly more complicated valuations than
those considered by Vickrey, it is not only the case that a (standard) competitive equilibrium may not
exist, but moreover possibly every competitive bundling equilibrium does not provide a constant factor
of the optimal welfare. We also show (Section 9) that even allowing for randomization by introducing
lotteries into the market is not guaranteed to improve the approximation factor; this is by an interesting
connection to optimal mechanism design.
We then consider combinatorial markets with heterogeneous goods, for which we obtain the following
results. We warm up by analyzing the two-consumer case, showing that (Section 2):
2Interdisciplinary readers will recall that an approximation parameter of α means the competitive bundling equilibrium
achieves at least OPT /α, where OPT is achieved by the objective-maximizing allocation, unrestricted to equilibrium
allocations. A smaller α means better approximation.
3Note that if one side of the market is of constant length we achieve a constant approximation.
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Theorem: For every combinatorial market with n = 2 subadditive consumers, there exists a competi-
tive bundling equilibrium that realizes an efficient allocation. For n = 2 general valuations, there exists
a competitive bundling equilibrium that provides a 32 -approximation to the optimal welfare, and this
factor is tight.
We prove the above theorem by reducing the market to a new market with only m = 2 goods. In such
a market, the set of subadditive valuations coincides with the set of gross substitutes valuations, for
which a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. By the first welfare theorem this equilibrium
is also efficient. For n > 2 consumers with general valuations, we obtain a weaker bound (Section 5):
Theorem: For every combinatorial market with n general valuations and m goods, there exists a
competitive bundling equilibrium that provides an O˜(
√
µ)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Our Ω(log n) lower bound for multi-unit markets clearly holds for general valuations, but we do not
know if competitive bundling equilibria can guarantee a better approximation ratio in this setting.
We also do not know whether it is possible to obtain better approximation ratios if the valuations
are known to be subadditive or even submodular – these are left as open questions. However, for
budget-additive valuations – an interesting subclass of submodular valuations – we are able to show the
following (Section 6):
Theorem: For every combinatorial market with n budget-additive valuations andm goods, there exists
a competitive bundling equilibrium that provides an O(log µ)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
We do not know whether this bound is tight (the Ω(log µ) lower bound does not hold here since it
requires a non-submodular valuation). However, we show an instance in which no competitive bundling
equilibrium can guarantee an approximation ratio better than 54 . A lower bound of
8
7 was previously
established by Feldman and Lucier [2014].
While our main focus is on the basic question of existence of competitive bundling equilibria with
good welfare guarantees, an additional interesting problem is to develop algorithms for finding such
equilibria. All of our results are constructive, and for most we present efficient algorithms that find an
equilibrium with welfare close to the existential guarantees. Yet, for several settings such as combinato-
rial markets with budget-additive consumers, it is an open question to design such efficient algorithms.
Revenue Maximization
Almost all of our bounds on the welfare are actually bounds on the revenue. For example, the O˜(
√
µ)-
approximation for welfare in markets with general valuations actually guarantees a competitive bundling
equilibrium which extracts at least Ω˜(1/
√
µ) of the optimal revenue. Since better bounds on revenue for
the classes of valuations we consider immediately imply better bounds on the welfare, we focus on the
class of gross substitutes valuations. When valuations are gross substitutes, a competitive equilibrium
always exists, and by the first welfare theorem the equilibrium allocation is efficient. However, it is
easy to see there are instances in which the revenue in every competitive equilibrium is 0 (even for
unit-demand valuations).
A natural approach to revenue extraction is limiting the supply, which has the effect of increasing
competition among the consumers [Roughgarden et al., 2012]. However, recall we are dealing with
markets that are unstable unless they clear; bundling should thus be done carefully to ensure market
clearance. This is a non-trivial task since the class of gross substitutes is not closed under bundling.
We focus on markets in which consumers have weighted matroid rank valuations, an important subclass
of gross substitutes valuations. We show that (Section 7):
Theorem: Consider a combinatorial market with m goods. For the following valuation settings, there
exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts as revenue an Ω(1/ log µ)-fraction of the optimal
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welfare:
1. All n valuations are weighted rank functions of uniform matroids.
2. All n valuations are weighted rank functions of a common matroid, but with different weights.
Notice that the optimal welfare is an obvious upper bound on the possible revenue that one can generate
from the market. We can show that both bounds are tight: even if the valuations are unit-demand (a
special case of both settings), no competitive bundling equilibrium can guarantee better revenue. An
interesting question is to determine whether it is possible to extend our revenue results to the class of
all gross substitutes valuations.
Organization
As a warm-up and to introduce some of our ideas, in Section 2 we give a complete analysis for two-
consumer markets. Section 3 develops several useful technical tools for welfare analysis. Section 4
gives a complete analysis of welfare guarantees in multi-unit markets. Section 5 discusses general mar-
kets, and Section 6 analyzes the case of budget-additive valuations. We proceed to address revenue
guarantees in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss the relationship between competitive bundling equi-
librium and the LP-based solution of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002]. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss
whether randomization can help circumvent our impossibility results. Some of the proofs are deferred
to Appendices A to C.
2 Warm-Up: Welfare Maximization with Two Consumers
In this warm-up section we provide an exact analysis of markets with two consumers. We show that
if both valuations are subadditive then there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that is fully
efficient. On the other hand, if at least one valuation is not subadditive, we can only guarantee an
approximation ratio of 3/2. We also show that this last bound is tight.
Recall that a valuation v is subadditive if for every two sets of items T,U it holds that v(T )+v(U) ≥
v(T ∪U). A valuation v is gross substitutes if for every item-price vectors ~q ≥ ~p, for every set of items
T in the demand set4 given prices ~p, there exists a set U in the demand set given prices ~q, such that
all items j ∈ T whose price did not increase (qj = pj) belong to U .
Lemma 2.1 For every combinatorial market with n subadditive consumers, there exists a competitive
bundling equilibrium that provides an n2 -approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof: Fix an optimal allocation of all items (O1, . . . , On). Without loss of generality assume that
v1(O1) ≥ v2(O2) ≥ . . . ≥ vn(On). Consider the bundling B = (B1, B2) where B1 = O1, B2 =
⋃
i≥2Oi,
which creates a new market instance with two items. It is well known that with two items, the class
of subadditive valuations coincides with the class of gross substitutes valuations Kelso and Crawford
[1982]. Therefore, the new market instance admits a competitive equilibrium, which is a special case of
a competitive bundling equilibrium and which maximizes the social welfare by the first welfare theorem.
The welfare of this competitive bundling equilibrium is at least v1(O1) + v2(O2), which in turn is at
least 2n · Σivi(Oi).
Corollary 2.2 For every combinatorial market with n = 2 subadditive consumers, there exists a com-
petitive bundling equilibrium that obtains the optimal welfare.
4Recall that given a valuation v and prices ~p, an item set T is in the demand set if it maximizes the payoff, i.e.,
v(T )−∑
j∈T
pj = maxU⊆M{v(U)−
∑
j∈U
pj}.
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We would like to show that this result cannot be extended to instances with two consumers and general
valuations. To prove this, we require a version of the second welfare theorem that asserts that a
competitive equilibrium exists in a market if and only if the following LP (the “configuration LP”) has
an optimal integral solution (see, e.g., Bikhchandani and Mamer [1997]):
Maximize: Σi,Sxi,Svi(S)
Subject to:
• For each item j: Σi,S|j∈Sxi,S ≤ 1
• for each bidder i: ΣSxi,S ≤ 1
• for each i, S: xi,S ≥ 0
We are now ready to prove that:
Proposition 2.3 There exists an instance with two consumers and two items such that every compet-
itive bundling equilibrium obtains at most 23 of the optimal welfare.
Proof: Consider an instance with m = 2 items and n = 2 consumers, where consumer 1 has value
1 for any single item, and value 2 + ǫ if he gets both items, where ǫ > 0; consumer 2 is unit-demand,
with value 2 for any item he gets. The optimal welfare equals 3.
We will show that there does not exist a competitive equilibrium in this market. Thus, in any
competitive bundling equilibrium the two items must be bundled together. The best solution in this
case is to give the bundle to consumer 1, achieving welfare 2 + ǫ. The approximation ratio of this
competitive bundling equilibrium approaches 3/2 as ǫ approaches 0.
Although it is not hard to directly prove that there is no competitive equilibrium in this market,
by the version of the second welfare theorem stated above it is sufficient to show a fractional solution
to the configuration LP that exceeds 3, which is the value of the optimal integral solution. Consider
the fractional solution which assigns half of the grand bundle to consumer 1, and assigns half of each
individual item to consumer 2. This value of this fractional solution is 3 + ǫ/2, which implies that a
competitive equilibrium does not exist. This finishes the proof
The impossibility result implied by Proposition 2.3 trivially extends to more consumers and items (by
adding consumers with zero valuations and items with zero marginal contribution), and is tight as the
next proposition asserts.
Proposition 2.4 For every combinatorial market with n = 2 consumers and general valuations, there
exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that provides a 32 -approximation to the optimal welfare.
The proof of Proposition 2.4 involves a careful case-by-case analysis and is deferred it to Appendix A.
3 General Welfare Maximization: Preparations
In the next sections we study welfare-maximizing competitive bundling equilibria in different combina-
torial markets. The goal of this section is to prepare our main “working horses” for this task, namely
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.5. The proofs of both lemmas use the following result from Feldman et al.
[2013]:
Theorem 3.1 (essentially Feldman et al. [2013]) In a combinatorial market with general, possibly
non-monotone valuations, let B be a bundling with bundle prices ~p. Then there exist a bundling B′ over
bundles in B, prices ~p′ over B′ and an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) over B′ such that:
1. For every i, let Ti ⊆ B be the set of bundles that Si is combined from, then p′i ≥ Σj∈Tipj .
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2. If some B ∈ B′ is not allocated then B ∈ B and p′B = pB.
3. For each consumer i we have that Si is in i’s demand set given prices p
′, i.e., vi(Si)−ΣB∈Sip′B ≥
vi(T )− ΣB∈T p′B for all T ⊆ B′.
Furthermore, the bundling, prices and allocation can be found using poly(m,n) demand queries given
B and ~p.5
Note that the bundling, prices and allocation guaranteed by Theorem 3.1 do not in general form a
competitive bundling equilibrium, since market clearance is not guaranteed, i.e., it does not necessarily
hold that ∪iSi =M .
Our first lemma shows how to “lift” a partial competitive bundling equilibrium (which is easier to
construct) to a proper competitive bundling equilibrium.
Definition 3.2 An allocation S over a bundling B and a vector of bundle prices ~p form a partial com-
petitive bundling equilibrium with respect to some set of consumers N ′, if they constitute a competitive
bundling equilibrium with respect to N ′.
In other words, the allocation, bundling and prices of a partial competitive bundling equilibrium con-
stitute a competitive bundling equilibrium assuming that the valuation of every consumer not in N ′ is
identically 0.
Lemma 3.3 Consider an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) over a bundling B and bundle prices ~p, which form
a partial competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to N ′ ⊆ N . Then there exists a bundling B′
over bundles in B, prices ~p′ over B′ and an allocation (S′1, . . . , S′n) over B′, which form a competitive
bundling equilibrium with welfare at least as high as the revenue of the partial competitive bundling
equilibrium: ∑
i∈N
vi(S
′
i) ≥
∑
B∈B
pB .
Furthermore, this competitive bundling equilibrium can be found using poly(m,n) demand queries given
the partial competitive bundling equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 3.3 appears in Appendix B. It makes use of the fact that Theorem 3.1 does not
even require the valuations to be monotone.
We also use a different method to prove the existence of a competitive bundling equilibrium with
good properties, as follows.
Definition 3.4 A high-demand priced bundling consists of a bundling B and bundle prices ~p, such
that for every bundle B ∈ B, there is a set NB ⊆ N of at least |B| consumers for which B is profitable:
∀i ∈ NB : vi(B)− pB > 0.
Lemma 3.5 Consider a high-demand priced bundling B with bundle prices ~p. Then there exists a
bundling B′ over bundles in B, prices ~p′ over B′ and an allocation (S′1, . . . , S′n) over B′, which form a
competitive bundling equilibrium with welfare at least as high as the aggregate price of the high-demand
priced bundling: ∑
i∈N
vi(S
′
i) ≥
∑
B∈B
pB .
Furthermore, this competitive bundling equilibrium can be found using poly(m,n) demand queries given
B and ~p.
5For given prices, a demand query for a certain valuation returns a member of its demand set under these prices.
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The proof of Lemma 3.5 appears in Appendix B.
Finally, the following simple lemma will be useful for our analysis.
Lemma 3.6 For every allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) of items M , there exists a value v and an allocation
S′ = (S′1, . . . , S
′
n) of M
′ ⊆ M such that for every S′i 6= ∅, vi(S′i) ∈ [v, 2v), and the welfare of S′ is a
logarithmic approximation to the welfare of S:
∑
i∈N
vi(S
′
i) ≥
1
α
∑
i∈N
vi(Si),
where α = 2(log µ + 2). Furthermore, v and S′ can be found given S in poly(m,n) time using value
queries.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 appears in Appendix B.
4 Welfare Maximization in Multi-Unit Markets
In this section we focus on multi-unit markets, and show existence of a competitive bundling equilibrium
with a logarithmic approximation ratio to the optimal social welfare, denoted by OPT. Our positive
result in Section 4.1 holds for any multi-item valuations, i.e., units may be a mixture of substitutes
and complements with respect to each other. We then show in Section 4.2 that this result is tight, in
the sense that there are multi-unit settings for which no competitive bundling equilibrium exists with
welfare better than a logarithmic fraction of OPT. In fact, this holds even if the valuations are all
subadditive.
4.1 A Logarithmic Approximation
We now state and prove our main positive result for this section.
Theorem 4.1 For every multi-unit market with n consumers and m items there exists a competi-
tive bundling equilibrium that provides an O(log µ)-approximation to the optimal welfare., where µ =
min{m,n}.
Proof: Consider a welfare-optimal allocation (O1, . . . , On) of the items. We show there exists a
high-demand priced bundling whose aggregate price is an O(log µ)-approximation to OPT; the proof
is then complete by applying Lemma 3.5.
We begin by applying Lemma 3.6 to show that there exist a value v and an allocation (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) of
an item subsetM ′ ⊆M , such that (i) for every consumer i with non-empty allocation, vi(O′i) ∈ [v, 2v);
(ii) a logarithmic fraction of the welfare is preserved:
∑
vi(O
′
i) ≥ OPT /Θ(log µ).
Without loss of generality assume |O′1| ≥ · · · ≥ |O′n|, and let n′ be the largest index such that |O′n′ | > 0.
If n′ = 1, the grand bundle can be allocated to consumer 1 for price v1(M) and we are done, so assume
from now on n′ > 1. We now use allocation O′ to show the existence of the high-demand priced
bundling.
Let B be a partition of all items into k = ⌊n′/2⌋ bundles of equal size (if k does not divide m, place
leftover items in one of the bundles arbitrarily). Note that each bundle B ∈ B has size at least |O′k+1|,
by the following argument:
m ≥
∑
i≤k
|O′i| ≥ k|O′k| =⇒ ⌊m/k⌋ ≥ |O′k| ≥ |O′k+1|.
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Set the price of every bundle to be pB = v− ǫ. All k bundles are profitable for consumers k+1, . . . , n′,
and since there are at least k such consumers we have a high-demand priced bundling. It remains to
show that the aggregate price k(v − ǫ) is a logarithmic fraction of OPT:
k(v − ǫ) ≥ 2v(2k + 1)/10 ≥ 2vn′/10 > 1
10
∑
vi(O
′
i) ≥ OPT /Θ(log µ),
where the first inequality is by choosing ǫ sufficiently small and the third inequality uses that vi(O
′
i) <
2v.
Remark 4.2 The above proof provides an algorithm for finding the guaranteed competitive bundling
equilibrium, which runs in poly(m,n) time and makes that many demand queries. We now show how
to transform it into an algorithm with poly(log(m), n) running time, which uses only value queries and
loses only an extra factor of 2 in the approximation ratio (recall that even in a multi-unit setting, demand
queries are known to be strictly stronger than value queries). This running time can be considered
polynomial for the multi-unit setting.
The idea is to preprocess, by bundling the items into equal-sized bundles of size m/n2 (ignoring
leftovers). Dobzinski and Nisan [2010] show that the optimal allocation of such bundles achieves a 2-
approximation to the optimal unconstrained welfare. All that is left to show is that demand queries for
this new setting can be simulated by poly(log(m), n) value queries. Since the total number of units in
any bundle is now a multiple of m/n2, one can use dynamic programming to simulate a demand query,
using only poly(log(m), n) value queries.
4.2 A Tight Impossibility Result
The next theorem shows that it is impossible to obtain an approximation ratio better than logarithmic
by a competitive bundling equilibrium, even if all valuations are subadditive.
Theorem 4.3 There exists a multi-unit market where n = m and valuations are subadditive, such that
every competitive bundling equilibrium has welfare that is a 1/Ω(logm)-fraction of the optimal social
welfare.
Proof: We construct the market as follows. Set n = m. For every i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, consumer i has
a unit-demand valuation with value 1/i (i.e., ∀S 6= ∅ : vi(S) = 1/i). Consumer 1’s has the following
valuation: for some small ǫ > 0, v1(S) = 1+ ǫ for every S of size |S| < m, and v1(M) = 2 + 2ǫ. Notice
that all valuations are subadditive.
The optimal allocation in this market allocates each of the consumers a single unit, achieving welfare
of
∑
i 1/i ≈ lnm. We will show that in every competitive bundling equilibrium, consumer 1 is allocated
all units, and thus the welfare is only 2 + 2ǫ.
For the rest of the proof we fix some competitive bundling equilibrium with allocation S over
bundling B with prices ~p. Let i′ be the smallest index of a consumer who is allocated a bundle from B.
Claim 4.4 Every non-empty bundle B ∈ B has the same price pB = p, and p ≤ 1/i′.
Proof: Denote the bundle from B allocated to consumer i′ by Bi′ . We first observe that consumer i′
cannot be charged more than p ≤ 1/i′ for Bi′ , otherwise his profit would be negative. Next, we observe
that the price of any other non-empty bundle B ∈ B that is allocated to some consumer i 6= i′ must
equal p: Since both i and i′ are unit demand we have that vi(B) = vi(Bi′) and vi′(B) = vi′(Bi′). Thus
if the price of one of these bundles is lower than the other, both i and i′ will prefer to be allocated that
bundle, and we are not at a competitive bundling equilibrium.
10
Now, suppose towards contradiction that i′ > 1. By definition, at most i′ consumers are allocated
in the competitive bundling equilibrium, and so by market clearance |B| ≤ i′. By Claim 4.4, the price
of every B ∈ B is at most 1/i′. The total price for all bundles in B is therefore at most 1.
Now consider consumer 1, whose profit is at most his value v1(S1). By the assumption that consumer
1 is not allocated all units, his value is at most 1+ǫ. Observe that v1(
⋃
B∈B B)−
∑
B∈B pB ≥ 2+2ǫ−1 =
1 + 2ǫ, in other words, consumer 1 strictly increases his profit by buying all bundles in B. This is
in contradiction to the profit maximization property of the competitive bundling equilibrium. This
completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
5 Welfare Maximization in General Markets
In this section we consider general markets with no assumptions on the valuations (except the stan-
dard ones of monotonicity and normalization). In Section 5.1 we show that for every combinatorial
market, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium whose allocation achieves a O˜(
√
µ)-
approximation to the optimal welfare. In Section 5.2 we address computational aspects.
5.1 Existential Result
The key lemma of this section is the following.
Lemma 5.1 Let v be a value and let S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sr) be an allocation of a subset of the items to
the first r consumers, such that ∀i ∈ [r] it holds that Si 6= ∅ and vi(Si) ∈ [v, 2v). Then there is a
competitive bundling equilibrium that achieves an O(
√
r)-approximation to the welfare of S.
Before proving this lemma we state and prove its corollary. Recall µ = min{m,n}.
Corollary 5.2 For every combinatorial market there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium with
welfare that is a O˜(
√
µ)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof: Apply Lemma 3.6 to the welfare-optimal allocation (O1, . . . , On) to get a value v and an
allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) of items M
′ ⊆ M . Without loss of generality, assume that exactly the
first r allocated parts in S are non-empty, and notice that r must be ≤ µ. We have that (i) for every
consumer i ∈ [r], vi(Si) ∈ [v, 2v); (ii) a logarithmic fraction of the welfare is preserved:
∑
i∈[r]
vi(Si) ≥ 1
O(log µ)
∑
i
vi(Oi). (2)
By applying Lemma 5.1 to the value v and allocation S, we get an O(
√
r) = O(
√
µ)-approximation to
the welfare of S. Combining this with Equation (2) completes the proof.
We now prove the key lemma.
Proof: [of Lemma 5.1] We show how to construct a high-demand priced bundling whose aggregate
sum of prices is an O(
√
r)-approximation to the welfare of S. The proof is then established by invoking
Lemma 3.5.
Begin by using the allocated parts S1, . . . , Sr to create new bundles, each but one containing ⌈
√
r⌉
parts Si, and the last one containing between ⌈
√
r⌉ and 2⌈√r⌉) of the parts. Add any items in M
that are unallocated in S to an arbitrary bundle. Let B denote the resulting partition, and set a price
pB = v for every B ∈ B.
We now show that the pair (B, ~p) is a high-demand priced bundling. By construction, |B| ≤ √r,
as the total number of bundles in S was r, and every B ∈ B contains at least √r such bundles.
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Furthermore, every bundleB is profitable for at least
√
r consumers (those who were originally allocated
the parts of S it contains, and value them at ≥ v). Now, recall that
∑
i∈[r]
vi(Si) ≤ 2vr. (3)
Since no bundle B ∈ B contains more than 2⌈√r⌉ ≤ 2√r + 2 parts Si, then |B| ≥ r/(2
√
r + 2), and so
we have that
∑
B∈B
pB = |B|v ≥ rv
2
√
r + 2
≥ 1
4
√
r + 4
∑
i∈[r]
vi(Si),
where the last inequality is by (3). This completes the proof.
5.2 Efficiently Finding an Equilibrium
Corollary 5.2 guarantees that in every market there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that
provides a O˜(
√
m) approximation to the optimal welfare. It is not hard to see that, if one is given a
welfare-optimal allocation, it also indicates how to construct such a competitive bundling equilibrium
in poly(m,n) time using demand queries. This is essentially due to the constructive nature and com-
putational guarantees of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, which are the main tools applied in the existential proof.
Yet finding a welfare-optimal allocation – or even one that provides an approximation ratio better than
O(
√
m) – is impossible in general without exponential communication [Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007, and
references within]. The purpose of this section is to show that a competitive bundling equilibrium with
somewhat weaker welfare guarantees can be constructed “from scratch”, in a computationally efficient
way using poly(m,n) demand queries.6
The main lemma of this section is as follows.
Lemma 5.3 For every combinatorial market and bundle size k ∈ [m], there is a computationally
efficient algorithm that finds a competitive bundling equilibrium using poly(m,n) demand queries, such
that for every allocation S to consumers Nk ⊆ N where |Si| ∈ [k, 2k) for every i ∈ Nk, the welfare of
the competitive bundling equilibrium is a O˜(
√
km)-approximation to the welfare of S.
Before proving this lemma we state and prove its corollary.
Corollary 5.4 There is a computationally efficient algorithm that for every combinatorial market uses
poly(m,n) demand queries to find a competitive bundling equilibrium with welfare that is a O˜(m2/3)-
approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof: We present an algorithm for constructing a high-welfare competitive bundling equilibrium.
The algorithm performs an exhaustive search – for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ⌈m1/3⌉}, it applies Lemma 5.3
to find a competitive bundling equilibrium for this k (the choice of enumeration range becomes clear
in the analysis below). It then compares the maximum welfare found by the exhaustive search to the
welfare of the competitive bundling equilibrium in which the grand bundle is allocated to consumer i∗
with the highest value for it, charging i∗’s value as payment. The algorithm returns the competitive
bundling equilibrium with the overall maximum welfare.
We now analyze the above algorithm and show it achieves a O˜(m2/3)-approximation; it is not hard to
see the algorithm is computationally efficient and uses poly(m,n) demand queries. Consider a welfare-
optimal allocation O = (O1, . . . , On). A variation
7 of Lemma 3.6 shows that there exists a bundle size
6The results of the previous section also imply that given an α-approximation algorithm for the allocation problem
over a special class of valuations, it is computationally efficient (using demand queries) to find a competitive bundling
equilibrium that provides a O˜(α
√
µ)-approximation. In particular, using the 2-approximation algorithm of Feige [2009],
it is tractable to find a competitive bundling equilibrium that provides a O˜(
√
µ)-approximation when all valuations are
known to be subadditive.
7The fact we consider a bundle size rather than value is the difference from Lemma 3.6.
12
k∗ ∈ [m], such that the set of consumers who are allocated roughly k∗ itemsNk∗ := {i : |Oi| ∈ [k∗, 2k∗)}
accounts for a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare:
∑
i∈Nk∗
vi(Oi) ≥ OPT /O(logm).
Denote by O′ the allocation to consumer set Nk∗ (observe that O,O
′ and k∗ are not assumed to be
known by the algorithm, and are only used in its analysis). There are two possible cases:
1. If k∗ ≤ m1/3, running the algorithm guaranteed by Lemma 5.3 will obtain a competitive bundling
equilibrium, whose welfare is at least a O˜(
√
k∗ ·m) ≤ O˜((m4/3)1/2) = O˜(m2/3)- approximation to
the welfare of O′, and thus also to the welfare of OPT.
2. If k∗ > m1/3, consider the competitive bundling equilibrium resulting from bundling all items
into a single grand bundle and allocating it to the consumer i∗ with the highest value for it.
Since at most m/k∗ consumers can be allocated a bundle of size ≥ k∗, the value of i∗ must be a
m/k∗ < m/m1/3 = O(m2/3) -approximation to OPT.
This completes the proof of the corollary.
We now prove this section’s key lemma.
Proof: [of Lemma 5.3] Given k, we define a greedy procedure Ak as follows. The procedure maintains
a set N ′ of consumers not yet allocated, and a set M ′ of items not yet allocated. Initially, N ′ ←− N
and M ′ ←−M . Until |M ′| < k, Ak repeats the following:
• Let
(i∗, A∗) = argmaxi∈N ′,A⊆M ′:|A|∈[k,2k){vi(A)}
be a pair of unallocated consumer and bundle of size ∈ [k, 2k) such that vi∗(A∗) is maxi-
mum. This is known to be efficiently computable with polynomially many demand queries
[Blumrosen and Nisan, 2005].
• Set N ′ ←− N ′ \ {i∗}, M ′ ←−M ′ \ S∗.
Without loss of generality let A = (A1, . . . , Ar) be the final allocation reached by Ak (where not
all items are necessarily allocated). Observe that since Ak allocates a bundle of size at least k in each
iteration, it must be the case that r ≤ m/k. The proof of the following inequality is included below for
completeness:
∑
i∈[r]
vi(Ai) ≥ W
2k
, (4)
whereW is the maximum welfare of an allocation S such that |Si| ∈ [k, 2k) for every non-empty bundle
Si.
We now apply Lemma 3.6 to A, resulting in a value v and allocation S′ involving at most r
consumers, to which in turn we can apply Lemma 5.1. It is not hard to see that the application of these
lemmas requires polynomial time and a polynomial number of demand queries.8 The final output of
Lemma 5.1 is a competitive bundling equilibrium with welfare that is a O˜(
√
m/k)-approximation to
the welfare of A, and a O˜(2k
√
m/k) = O˜(
√
km)-approximation to W .
It is left to prove Inequality (4). Consider the tth step of procedure Ak. Let i1, . . . , it be the
consumers chosen in steps 1 to t and let Mt be the items allocated. Let ALGt be the aggregate
welfare, that is, ALGt =
∑
ℓ≤t viℓ(Aiℓ); set ALG0 = 0. Let Wt be the welfare of the allocation S
8Value queries, when used, can be simulated by demand queries [Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007].
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restricted to yet unallocated items M \Mt (note that Wt is decreasing in t); set W0 = W . Observe
that ALGt−ALGt−1 = vit(Ait). We claim that
Wt−1 −Wt ≤ 2k(ALGt−ALGt−1). (5)
Assuming this claim holds, starting with t = 1 and summing over all steps of the procedure we get that
W ≤ 2k∑i∈[r] vi(Ai), as required.
We now prove Inequality (5) for t = 1; the proof for the following steps is similar and thus omitted.
Consider consumer i1 receiving Ai1 in the first step of procedure Ak. If i1 was allocated Ai1 in S then
we are done. Otherwise, we gain vi1(Ai1), and lose at most the aggregate value of the ≤ |Ai1 | ≤ 2k
other consumers whose bundles in S intersect with Ai1 . Since vi1(Ai1) is at least as large as the value
of each of these consumers (else, procedure Ak would have chosen one of them as the first consumer to
allocate to), Inequality (5) follows. This also completes the proof of Inequality (4) and of Lemma 5.3.
6 Welfare Maximization with Budget-Additive Valuations
In Section 5 we showed that every combinatorial market admits a competitive bundling equilibrium that
provides an approximation ratio of O˜(
√
m) to the social welfare. A natural next step is to understand
whether we can get better approximation ratios for specific subclasses. We make progress towards
this goal by showing that if the valuations are all budget additive9 then we can get a logarithmic
approximation. The best lower bound we currently know shows that no market with budget additive
valuations can achieve an approximation ratio better than 54 .
6.1 A Logarithmic Approximation
Theorem 6.1 In every combinatorial market with budget-additive valuations, there is a competitive
bundling equilibrium with welfare that is an O(logm)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof: We construct an allocation as follows. For every valuation vi with budget bi, define another
valuation v′i where v
′
i(S) = min{
∑
j∈S vi(j), 2bi}. Recall the greedy algorithm of Lehmann et al. [2006]
for submodular valuations: consider the items one by one in an arbitrary order, and allocate each item
to a consumer that maximizes the marginal value for it given the items he received until now. Let
A = (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation that the greedy algorithm produces when running on valuations
v′1, . . . , v
′
n. Let E¯ := {i | vi(Ai) = bi} be the set of consumers who have exhausted their budgets in
the allocation A, and let E¯ := {i | vi(Ai) < bi} be the set of consumers who haven’t exhausted their
budgets.
Claim 6.2 The allocation A satisfies the following properties:
1. The welfare of A is a 4-approximation to the optimal welfare:
∑
i∈N vi(Ai) ≥ OPT /4.
2. For every consumer i ∈ E¯ and item j ∈ Ai, it holds that vi(j) ≥ maxi′∈E¯{vi′(j)}.
Proof: [of Claim 6.2] For the first part, recall that the greedy algorithm provides a 2-approximation to
the optimal welfare with respect to the valuations v′i [Lehmann et al., 2006]. Since for each bidder i the
difference between vi and v
′
i is only the budget, we have that for every bundle S, vi(S) ≤ v′i(S) ≤ 2vi(S).
Two direct consequences of this inequality are:
9A valuation v is budget additive if for every bundle S we have that v(S) = min{∑
j∈S
v(j), b}.
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• The welfare of the optimal allocation with respect to the valuations {vi} is at most the welfare
of the optimal allocation with respect to the valuations {v′i}.
• For every i, vi(Ai) ≥ v′i(Ai)/2.
Together these imply the first part of the claim. The second part is a direct consequence of the definition
of the greedy algorithm.
We now distinguish between two cases:
1. Most of the welfare in allocation A comes from consumers in E:
∑
i∈E
vi(Ai) ≥ 1
2
∑
i∈N
vi(Ai).
Assume that for all i ∈ E, bi ≥
∑
i′∈E vi′(Ai′)/2m – this is without loss of generality as such
consumers contribute at least a quarter of the total welfare of A (c.f., proof of Lemma 3.6).
Divide the consumers in E into bins according to their budgets, such that consumer i is in bin b
if bi ∈ [b, 2b). Notice there are at most logm + 2 bins. Denote the set of players in bin b by Sb.
By the pigeonhole principle, there must be one bin b such that
∑
i∈Sb
bi ≥
∑
i∈E bi
logm+ 2
=
∑
i∈E vi(Ai)
logm+ 2
≥
∑
i∈N vi(Ai)
4(logm+ 2)
,
where the equality is by definition of E. On the other hand, by definition of Sb we have
∑
i∈Sb
bi ≤
|Sb| · 2b, since b ≤ bi < 2b. Combining both inequalities we get
|Sb| · b ≥
∑
i∈N vi(Ai)
8(logm+ 2)
≥ OPT
32(logm+ 2)
=
OPT
O(logm)
, (6)
where the second transition is by Claim 6.2.
To complete the construction, for every i ∈ Sb place all items in Ai in the same bundle, and add
any remaining items (items that were allocated to other consumers or were not allocated at all)
to an arbitrary bundle. Denote the resulting bundles by Bi. Now allocate Bi to every consumer
i ∈ Sb for a uniform price of pBi = b. We claim we have constructed a partial competitive bundling
equilibrium with respect to the consumers in Sb. To see this, note that Sb ⊆ E and therefore
vi(Bi) = bi, so Bi maximizes the value of consumer i ∈ Sb. Since the price of all bundles is b, Bi
is contained in the demand set of consumer i.
We now apply Lemma 3.3 to obtain a competitive bundling equilibrium with welfare at least
∑
i∈Sb
pBi =
∑
i∈Sb
b = |Sb| · b ≥ OPT
O(log m)
,
where the last inequality is by (6). This proves the welfare guarantee for the first case.
2. Most of the welfare in allocation A comes from consumers in E¯:
∑
i∈E¯
vi(Ai) ≥ 1
2
∑
i∈N
vi(Ai).
For every i ∈ E¯ place all items in Ai in the same bundle. Let T be the set of all remaining items
(items that were allocated to consumers in E or were not allocated at all). Add T to the bundle
of consumer i∗ where i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈E¯{vi(Ai ∪ T )}. Denote the resulting bundles by Bi. Set the
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Table 1: A lower bound for budget-additive consumers
a b c Budget
Consumer 1 2 1 1 2
Consumer 2 0 2 2 2
Consumer 3 2− ǫ 0 1− ǫ/2− δ 2− ǫ
price of Bi to be pBi = vi(Bi). We claim we have constructed a partial competitive bundling
equilibrium with respect to the consumers in E¯. To prove this we need to show that for every
i ∈ E¯, Bi is in the demand set of i.
Fix a consumer i ∈ E¯. Claim 6.2 guarantees that for any i′ ∈ E¯ \ {i∗}, vi(Bi′) ≤
∑
j∈Bi′
vi(j) ≤∑
j∈Bi′
vi′(j) = vi′(Bi′) = pBi′ , so i gains no profit from bundle Bi′ . Furthermore, he gains no
profit from Bi∗ , since by definition i
∗ is the value-maximizing consumer for this bundle and the
price is set to be i∗’s value. Thus, we get a partial competitive bundling equilibrium and in
particular: ∑
i∈E¯
pBi =
∑
i∈E¯
vi(Bi) ≥ 1
2
∑
i∈N
vi(Ai) ≥ OPT /8,
where the final inequality is by Claim 6.2. Using Lemma 3.3 we conclude that there is a compet-
itive bundling equilibrium with welfare at least OPT /8.
6.2 An Impossibility Result
The next result shows that a constant-factor loss in welfare is inevidable for budget-additive valuations.
Proposition 6.3 There exists a combinatorial market with budget-additive valuations such that every
competitive bundling equilibrium has welfare that is at most a 45-fraction of the optimal welfare.
Proof: Let ǫ, δ be arbitrarily small positive constants and consider the budget-additive instance in
Table 1. It is not hard to verify that the optimal integral allocation is obtained by giving items a, b and
c to consumers 1, 2 and 3 respectively, yielding OPT = 5− ǫ/2− δ. As in Section 2, we will show there
exists a better fractional solution to the configuration LP, implying there is no competitive equilibrium
for this instance and hence bundling items is necessary to obtain a competitive bundling equilibrium.
A straightforward calculation shows that in this case, the best solution is to give item a to consumer
1 (for a price of 2− ǫ), and the bundle {b, c} to consumer 2 (for a price of 2), yielding total welfare of
v1(a) + v2({b, c}) = 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, the approximation ratio of the competitive bundling equilibrium
approaches 5/4 as ǫ, δ approach 0.
To see that there exists a better fractional solution, consider the solution which assigns to consumer
1 item a with probability 1/2 and bundle {b, c} with probability 1/2, to consumer 2 item b with
probability 1/2 and item c with probability 1/2, and to consumer 3 item a with probability 1/2. This
is a feasible solution to the LP and gives an objective value of
1
2
(v1(a) + v1({b, c})) + 1
2
(v2(b) + v2(c)) +
1
2
v3(a) = 2 + 2 +
2− ǫ
2
= 5− ǫ
2
,
which is greater than the optimal integral solution.
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7 Revenue Guarantees for Matroid Rank Valuations
The first welfare theorem guarantees that whenever a competitive equilibrium exists it maximizes social
welfare. However, there is no guarantee on the revenue in equilibrium – indeed, there are markets in
which every competitive equilibrium has 0 revenue, even if all consumers have unit-demand valuations.
This is the case, for example, in a market with m identical items and n < m unit-demand consumers:
since supply exceeds demand, the equilibrium price of every item is 0.
In this section we study revenue guarantees in two interesting subclasses of gross substitutes val-
uations (which, in particular, both include unit-demand valuations). For both classes we show that
a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare can be extracted in a competitive bundling equilibrium.
Note that this is the best fraction one can hope for, as is evident from the following example, which is
a simplified version of the market that appears in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Example 7.1 Suppose there are m = n items and consumer i is unit-demand with value 1/i for any
item. By applying similar arguments to the ones appearing in the proof of Theorem 4.3, in every
competitive bundling equilibrium, the total price for all the bundles is at most 1, whereas the optimal
welfare is lnn (obtained by assigning a single item to each consumer).
We note that this example was previously observed in Feldman et al. [2013].
Before turning to the statement of the revenue guarantees, let us recall the formal definition of a
matroid (see, e.g., Schrijver [2003]), and present the two subclasses considered in our theorem. A set
system (M,IM ) (whereM is a set of items and IM is a family of independent subsets ofM) is a matroid
if (1) ∅ ∈ IM , (2) the family of independent sets IM is downward closed and (3) the exchange property
holds: if S, T ∈ IM and |S| > |T |, then there exists an element j ∈ S \ T such that T ∪ {j} ∈ IM . One
of the simplest matroids is a k-uniform matroid, whose independent sets are simply all sets of size at
most k.
The matroid rank function r : 2M → Z+ assigns every set S ⊆M the size of the largest independent
set which is a subset of S. The rank of a matroid is the maximum rank over all sets. A valuation v
is a weighted matroid rank function if there is a matroid (M,IM ), and non-negative weights {wj}j∈M
such that for every item set S ⊆M , v(S) is the weight of the maximum-weight independent set which
is a subset of S:
v(S) = max
T⊆S, T∈IM
∑
j∈T
wj .
In this section we consider the following two settings:
• Every consumer has a weighted matroid rank function of a uniformmatroid, possibly with different
ranks and different weights.
• Every consumer has a weighted matroid rank function of the same general matroid, possibly with
different weights.
Note that the two settings are incomparable. In the former, different consumers have different matroids,
but all matroids are uniform, while in the latter, all consumers have the same matroid (possibly with
different weights), but that matroid is not necessarily uniform. With this we are ready to state our
result.
Theorem 7.1 For every market with consumers whose valuations are weighted matroid rank functions,
in either of the two settings above, there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts as
revenue at least Ω( 1logm) of the optimal welfare.
The proof of the theorem appears in Appendix C.
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8 Optimal Welfare and Relation to Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium
In this section we discuss the relation between the solution concept of competitive bundling equi-
librium, and that of non-linear pricing equilibrium (a.k.a. second-order pricing equilibrium) due to
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002]. The motivation for their concept is similar to our motivation – they
develop the package assignment model, in which trade can be of bundles rather than just individual
items, and aim to extend the scope of competitive equilibrium to this model.10 A non-linear pricing
equilibrium is an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) of items to consumers, and a vector of 2
m bundle prices ~p,
such that:
1. Profit Maximization: For every consumer i and alternative set of items T , vi(Si) − pSi ≥
vi(T )− pT .
2. Revenue Maximization: For every alternative allocation (T1, . . . , Tn),
∑
i pSi ≥
∑
i pTi .
The main difference between this and our solution concept is the use of non-linear prices, whereas in a
competitive bundling equilibrium the prices given the bundling are additive.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy design a linear program called CAP2 and show that it characterizes non-
linear pricing equilibria, i.e., such an equilibrium exists if and only if the optimal fractional solution
to CAP2 occurs at an integral solution, and if so the primal and dual variables correspond to the
equilibrium allocation and prices. As a corollary they get that non-linear pricing equilibria – when
exist – achieve optimal welfare.
We show here that existence of a non-linear pricing equilibrium implies the existence of a com-
petitive bundling equilibrium with optimal welfare; this implication of non-linear pricing equilibria
was not previously observed to our knowledge, and it can be viewed as a version of the second wel-
fare theorem for competitive bundling equilibria – if an integral optimal solution exists for CAP2,
then a competitive bundling equilibrium whose allocation corresponds to this solution also exists [c.f.,
Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007, Theorem 11.15]). One implication of the above is that for markets with
superadditive11 consumers, there exists an efficient competitive bundling equilibrium, and moreover
it can be reached via an ascending auction [Parkes and Ungar, 2000; Sun and Yang, 2014]. We also
identify market settings in which a non-linear pricing equilibrium does not exist, yet there exists a
competitive bundling equilibrium with optimal welfare. We interpret this as indicating that there is a
sense in which the solution concept of competitive bundling equilibrium dominates that of non-linear
pricing equilibrium, in terms of the welfare it can achieve stably.
We summarize the relation between the two solution concepts as follows:
Proposition 8.1 Consider a combinatorial market.
(a) The existence of a non-linear pricing equilibrium implies the existence of an efficient competitive
bundling equilibrium.
(b) The existence of an efficient competitive bundling equilibrium does not always imply the existence
of a non-linear pricing equilibrium.
Proof: By combining Lemma 8.2 with Example 8.1 or Example 8.2.
The proof of part (a) of the proposition builds upon complementary slackness properties of the
optimal integral solution to CAP2 (see Lemma 8.2 in Section 8.1); the proof of part (b) is by showing
an integrality gap for the same linear program (see examples in Section 8.2). For completeness we state
here the linear program CAP2 and its dual. As usual S denotes a set of items and B denotes a bundling.
10Their model also includes multiple sellers.
11A valuation v is superadditive if for every two sets of items T,U it holds that v(T ) + v(U) ≤ (T ∪ U).
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The variables of the primal are xi,S, which is the fraction of bundle S allocated to consumer i, and zB,
which is the fraction of bundling B determining the bundles that can be allocated. The dual variables
are πi, which is the payoff of consumer i, π0, which is the revenue, and pS, which is the (non-linear)
price of bundle S. CAP2 and its dual are:
max
∑
i,S(xi,Svi(S))
s.t.
∑
S xi,S ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N (7)∑
i xi,S ≤
∑
B:S∈B zB ∀S ⊆M (8)∑
B zB ≤ 1 (9)
xi,S, zB ≥ 0.
min π0 +
∑
i πi
s.t. πi ≥ vi(S)− pS ∀i ∈ N,S ⊆M (10)
π0 ≥
∑
S∈B pS ∀B (11)
π0, πi, pS ≥ 0.
8.1 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium Implies Efficient Competitive Bundling Equi-
librium
Lemma 8.2 If the optimal fractional solution to CAP2 occurs at an integral solution with allocation
(S1, . . . , Sn) over bundling B and non-linear prices ~p, then (S1, . . . , Sn) over B with bundle prices ~p′
according to ~p form an efficient competitive bundling equilibrium.
Proof: We begin with the optimal integral solution above. Notice that by Conditions (7) and (8),
Si ∈ B for every i. The lemma follows immediately from three claims:
1. If S ∈ B is unallocated, pS = 0: By complementary slackness, for every S ∈ B such that pS > 0,
Condition (8) must hold with equality, so S is allocated to some consumer i.
2. The allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) maximizes welfare: This follows from Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002].
3. For every consumer i and bundle set T over B, vi(Si)− p′Si ≥ vi(T )−
∑
B∈T p
′
B.
We now prove the third claim. The bundle prices ~p′ are set according to ~p, and so p′B = pB for
every B ∈ B. This means we need to show that vi(Si) − pSi ≥ vi(T ) −
∑
B∈T pB . By complementary
slackness and Condition (10),
vi(Si)− pSi = πi ≥ vi(T )− pT ,
where slightly abusing notation, pT is the price of the set
⋃
B∈T B. It is left to show that pT ≤
∑
B∈T pB.
By complementary slackness and Condition (11), this subadditivity of prices indeed holds:
∑
B∈B
pB =
∑
B∈B\T
pB +
∑
B∈T
pB = π0 ≥
∑
B∈B\T
pB + pT ,
and so
∑
B∈T pB ≥ pT as required.
Note that strictly speaking we require a competitive bundling equilibrium to have
⋃
i Si = M ; by
the first claim above we can simply allocate any unallocated S ∈ B with price pS = 0 to an arbitrary
consumer, and the third claim will still hold. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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8.2 Efficient Competitive Bundling Equilibrium Does Not Imply Non-Linear Pric-
ing Equilibrium
The examples below show markets in which an efficient competitive bundling equilibrium exists but a
non-linear pricing equilibrium does not. To prove the latter we provide for each example a certificate
showing an integrality gap for CAP2.
Example 8.1 (Two items) Consider a combinatorial market with two consumers and two items.
Consumer 1 has value of 8 for both items together and 0 otherwise. Consumer 2 is unit-demand and
values each item at 7. An efficient competitive bundling equilibrium bundles both items together and
allocates the bundle to consumer 1 for a price between 7 and 8. A certificate showing there is no non-
linear pricing equilibrium is the following fractional solution to CAP2 that achieves 11 instead of 8:
x1,ab = x2,a = x2,b = 0.5, and zab = za,b = 0.5.
Example 8.2 (Submodular valuations) Consider a combinatorial market with two consumers and
four items a, b, c, d. Consumer 1’s submodular valuation: All items valued at 1, the pairs ab, cd are
valued at 2, all other pairs ac, ad, bc, bd are valued at 1.5, all sets of three or four items valued at
2. Consumer 2’s submodular valuation: All items valued at 1, the pairs ad, bc are valued at 2, all
other pairs ab, ac, bd, cd are valued at 1.5, all sets of three or four items valued at 2. An efficient
competitive bundling equilibrium bundles ab together and cd together, allocates the bundle ab to consumer
1 for price 1.5, and allocates cd to consumer 2 for price 1.5. A certificate showing there is no non-
linear pricing equilibrium is the following fractional solution to CAP2 that achieves 4 instead of 3.5:
x1,ab = x1,cd = x2,ad = x2,bc = 0.5, and zab,cd = zad,bc = 0.5.
9 Welfare Maximization: Does Randomness Help?
Given the negative result in Theorem 4.3, stating that competitive bundling equilibria cannot guarantee
more than a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare in the worst case, a natural question is whether
introducing randomness in the form of lotteries can help circumvent this lower bound.
Randomness in the context of competitive equilibrium dates back to Prescott and Townsend [1984].
Garratt [1995] studies lottery equilibria, and while his paper does not involve bundling, we can build
upon its notions. In particular, a market with lotteries is one in which the allocation to every consumer
is a distribution over bundles – that is, a lottery ticket – and the allocation of lottery tickets to
consumers must correspond to some joint probability distribution over item allocations. Consumers
aim to maximize their expected profit.
We now define a competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries: This is a competitive bundling
equilibrium over bundles of lottery tickets, whose allocation must correspond to a distribution over
item allocations, with an additional requirement of ex post market clearance. I.e., we require that
after the lotteries are run, the market clears from all the items. The reason for this is discussed in the
Introduction – to maintain the concept of an equilibrium, producers must not have the opportunity to
lower prices and sell more. As further discussed there, such equilibria are not applicable to all markets,
and require an assumption of trade restriction among the consumers after the lotteries are run.12
Definition 9.1 A competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries is a competitive bundling equilibrium
in a market of lottery tickets, whose allocation corresponds to a distribution over item allocations, each
of which clears the market of items.
12Note that if this assumption is dropped, then regardless of the use of lotteries, the ex post allocation should form
a competitive equilibrium or competitive bundling equilibrium, and so lotteries fail to enrich the solution concept – c.f.,
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [2002].
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We can now state our main result for this section – an impossibility result with lotteries.
Theorem 9.2 There exists a multi-unit setting where n = m and valuations are subadditive, such that
every competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries has welfare which is a (1/Ω(logm))-factor of OPT.
The proof is by an interesting connection between our market setting and between optimal mecha-
nism design in a single-parameter auction setting.
Proof: [of Theorem 9.2] Recall the setting introduced in the proof of Theorem 4.3. We will refer to
this setting here as the equal-price market. Recall from the proof of Theorem 4.3 that the logarithmic
lower bound follows from the fact that in any competitive bundling equilibrium, all units are allocated
to consumer 1. We now prove that in any competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries, ex post all
the units are allocated to consumer 1.
Consider a competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries. Let α denote the probability with
which consumer 1 receives all units. Then due to ex post market clearance, 1 − α is the probability
that at least one consumer 2, . . . , n receives at least one unit. We argue that it is sufficient to show
that the total payment of the unit-demand consumers cannot exceed 1 − α. Indeed, assume this
holds and consider consumer 1. Assume for contradiction that consumer 1 is allocated a subset of
lottery tickets that does not guarantee him all units ex post, i.e., α < 1. His expected value is then
(1−α)(1+ ǫ)+α(2+ 2ǫ) = (1+α)(1+ ǫ). If he were to buy all remaining lottery tickets instead of the
unit-demand consumers, the increase in his expected profit would be at least (1−α)(1+ǫ)−(1−α) > 0.
This is by our assumption that the total payment of the unit-demand consumers is ≤ 1− α. We thus
have a contradiction – if there is a chance that bidder 1 does not receive all units ex post, he can strictly
improve his expected profit by buying all lottery tickets.
In the remainder of the proof we show the following claim:
Claim 9.3 The total payment of the unit-demand consumers is upper-bounded by 1− α.
To prove this claim, we reduce our setup to a Bayesian auction setting, with a single bidder and
a single item for sale. We will then show that a competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries in
the equal-price market corresponds to a truthful and individually rational (IR) randomized mechanism
in the auction setting, such that the expected revenue of the auction mechanism is at least the total
payment of the unit-demand consumers in the equilibrium. We can then apply Myerson’s theorem to
show that the optimal expected revenue in the auction setting is at most 1−α, implying that the total
payment of the unit-demand consumers cannot exceed 1− α.
The equal-revenue auction setting is as follows: There is a single item for sale and a single bidder,
whose value is uniformly distributed over the n− 1 values in the discrete range {1/2, . . . , 1/n}. Denote
the discrete value distribution by F .
Claim 9.4 For every competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries in the equal-price market, in which
consumer 1 receives all units with probability α, there is a truthful IR randomized mechanism in the
equal-revenue auction, such that:
• For every bid, the probability that the mechanism allocates the item to the bidder is at most 1−α;
• The expected revenue of the mechanism is at least a (1/(n − 1))-fraction of the total payment of
the unit-demand consumers in the market.
Proof: [of Claim 9.4] Consider a competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries in the equal-price
market. We introduce the following notation: for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let (xi, pi) denote the total
probability with which consumer i is allocated at least one unit in the competitive bundling equilibrium
with lotteries, and let pi be the price that consumer i is charged. Consumer i’s profit is (xi/i) − pi
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(using that we’re in a multi-unit setting with unit-demand consumers). Note that xi ≤ 1 − α by the
assumption that consumer 1 receives all units with probability α.
By the well-known taxation principle of mechanism design, every truthful and IR mechanism in the
equal-revenue auction can be described as a menu of (xi, pi) pairs, where xi is the allocation probability
of the item, and pi is the price. The bidder chooses among the menu options according to his value for
the item, picking the most profitable one for him. Also, every such price menu corresponds to an IR
mechanism, as long as for every value in the range of F , there is at least one menu option that results
in non-negative expected profit for the bidder.
We can thus take the (xi, pi) pairs of the unit-demand consumers in the equal-price market, and view
them as an IR mechanism in the equal-revenue auction. The mechanism is indeed IR because for every
value 1/i in the support of F , the pair (xi, pi) results in non-negative expected profit (xi/i)− pi for the
bidder, otherwise we would have a violation of profit maximization for consumer i in the competitive
bundling equilibrium with lotteries (Definition 9.1).
The resulting mechanism is also truthful, in the sense that when the bidder’s value is 1/i, a profit-
maximizing menu option for him is (xi, pi). This is again since we have ex ante profit maximization
in the competitive bundling equilibrium with lotteries, i.e., consumer i is allocated one of his demand
sets. Now we see that the two properties in Claim 9.4 hold – for every menu option the allocation
probability is xi ≤ 1− α, and the expected revenue is the average menu price, i.e., 1/(n− 1) times the
total payment of the unit-demand consumers.
Claim 9.5 Consider a truthful IR mechanism in the equal-revenue auction that allocates the item to the
bidder with probability at most 1−α for every bid. Then its expected revenue is at most (1−α)/(n−1).
Proof: [of Claim 9.5] Consider a truthful IR mechanism as defined. The equal-revenue auction is
a single-parameter setting, and F is a (discrete) regular distribution.13 Thus by Myerson’s theory of
optimal mechanisms, the expected revenue of the mechanism is equal to its expected virtual surplus,
and the optimal expected revenue can be achieved by a deterministic mechanism Myerson [1981]. For
the equal-revenue auction, any deterministic mechanism is simply a reserve price, and it is not hard to
see that every reserve price extracts revenue of ≤ 1/(n − 1). The optimal expected virtual surplus is
thus ≤ 1/(n− 1). Observe that the optimal expected virtual surplus is achieved by allocating the item
to the bidder with probability 1 if and only if his bid yields a positive virtual value. Since we require
the mechanism to allocate the item with probability ≤ 1−α for every bid, the maximum virtual surplus
it can achieve is ≤ (1− α)/(n − 1).
This concludes the proof of Claim 9.3 and Theorem 9.2.
References
Ausubel, L. and Milgrom, P. 2002. Ascending auctions with package bidding. The B.E. Journal
of Theoretical Economics 1, 1, 1–44.
Bikhchandani, S. and Mamer, J. W. 1997. Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with
indivisibilities. Journal of Economic Theory 74, 2, 385–413.
Bikhchandani, S. and Ostroy, J. M. 2002. The package assignment model. Journal of Economic
Theory 107, 377–406.
Blumrosen, L. and Nisan, N. 2005. On the computational power of iterative auctions I: Demand
queries. In Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC).
13The virtual value corresponding to a bid 1/i is 1/i(i − 1). For more on discrete regular distributions see, e.g.,
Chawla et al. [2006]).
22
Blumrosen, L. and Nisan, N. 2007. Combinatorial auctions. In Algorithmic Game Theory, N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E´. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 11.
Candogan, O., Ozdaglar, A., and Parrilo, P. A. 2013. Iterative auction design for graphical
valuations part I: Tree valuations. Working Paper.
Chawla, S., Hartline, J. D., Rajan, U., and Ravi, R. 2006. Bayesian optimal no-deficit mecha-
nism design. In Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE). 136–148.
Dobzinski, S. and Nisan, N. 2010. Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. Journal of Artificial Intel-
ligence Research 37, 85–98.
Dwyer, J. 2010. Clothing retailer says it will no longer destroy unworn garments. The New York
Times.
Feige, U. 2009. On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive. SIAM J. on Comput-
ing 39, 1, 122–142.
Feldman, M., Gravin, N., and Lucier, B. 2013. Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium. In Proc.
44th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC). 61–70.
Feldman, M. and Lucier, B. 2014. Clearing markets via bundles. arXiv:1401.2702.
Garratt, R. 1995. Decentralizing lottery allocations in markets with indivisible commodities. Econ.
Theory 5, 295–313.
Gul, F. and Stacchetti, E. 1999. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic
Theory 87, 1, 95–124.
Hatfield, J. W., Kominers, S. D., Nichifor, A., Ostrovsky, M., and Westkamp, A. 2014.
Chain stability in trading networks. Working paper.
Kelso, A. and Crawford, V. P. 1982. Job-matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes.
Econometrica 50, 6, 1483–1504.
Lahaie, S. and Parkes, D. C. 2009. Fair package assignment. In AMMA’09: Proceedings of the
First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications.
Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D. J., and Nisan, N. 2006. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing
marginal utilities. Games and Economic Behavior 55, 2, 270–296.
Levin, J. and Milgrom, P. 2010. Online advertising: Heterogeneity and conflation in market design.
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 100, 603–607.
Manelli, A. M. and Vincent, D. R. 2006. Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-
good monopolist. Journal of Economic Theory 127, 1–35.
Mas-Collel, A., Whinston, M. D., and Green, J. R. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford
University Press.
Milgrom, P. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press.
Myerson, R. 1981. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 1, 58–73.
Parkes, D. 2006. Iterative combinatorial auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions, P. Cramton,
Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, Eds. MIT Press, Chapter 2.
23
Parkes, D. C. 1999. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proc. 1st ACM Conf.
on Electronic Commerce (EC). 148–157.
Parkes, D. C. and Ungar, L. H. 2000. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In
AAAI’00: Proceedings of the 17th national conference on Artificial intelligence. 74–81.
Parkes, D. C. and Ungar, L. H. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. In Proc.
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on The Economics of the Internet. Stanford,
CA.
Prescott, E. and Townsend, R. 1984. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse
selection and moral hazard. Econometrica 52, 21–45.
Roughgarden, T., Talgam-Cohen, I., and Yan, Q. 2012. Supply-limiting mechanisms. In Proc.
13th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC). ACM Press, 844–861.
Schrijver, A. 2003. Combinatorial Optimziation: Polyhedra and Efficiency. Springer.
Sun, N. and Yang, Z. 2006. Equilibria and indivisibilities: gross substitutes and complements.
Econometrica 74, 1385–1402.
Sun, N. and Yang, Z. 2014. An efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for multiple
complements. Journal of Political Economy . To appear.
Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. of Finance 16,
8–37.
Vohra, R. V. 2011. Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach (Econometric Society
Monographs). Cambridge University Press.
A Missing Proof: Two Consumers
Proof: [of Proposition 2.4] We first claim that we can assume without loss of generality that there are
only two items in the market (i.e., m = 2). This is true since we can always bundle the m items into (at
most) two bundles, according to the optimal solution. That is, each of the two bundles would consist
of the items allocated to one of the consumers in the optimal allocation, and the new values would
be the values over these bundles. Clearly, this does not affect the value of OPT, and any competitive
bundling equilibrium that is produced from these bundles is a valid competitive bundling equilibrium
in the original market.
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the theorem for an instance with two consumers, 1 and 2, and two
items, a and b. Let xa, xb, xab denote consumer 1’s values for a, b, and the bundle {a, b}, respectively,
and let ya, yb, yab denote the analogous values of consumer 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that
OPT = xa + yb,
as otherwise the optimal solution is supported by a competitive bundling equilibrium. Also assume
(without loss of generality) that xa ≥ yb. In addition, we may assume that one of the consumers has a
subadditive valuation, and the other has a superadditive valuation. Indeed, for the case of two items,
the class of subadditive valuations coincides with gross substitutes valuations, which always admits
an item-price competitive equilibrium, and therefore obtains the optimal welfare. Likewise, if both
consumers are superadditive, then there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that obtains
the optimal welfare.
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Clearly, if either xab ≥ 23 ·OPT or yab ≥ 23 ·OPT, then there exists a competitive bundling equilibrium
that obtains at least 23 of the welfare by bundling the two items together. Therefore, in the remainder
of the proof we assume that both values are strictly smaller than 23 ·OPT. Substituting OPT = xa+yb,
we get
xab, yab <
2
3
(xa + yb). (12)
By monotonicity (i.e., since xa ≤ xab), it also holds that
yb ≥ 1
2
xa. (13)
We now distinguish between two cases, and establish the existence of an item-priced competitive
equilibrium for both of them. Recall that, by the first welfare theorem, if a competitive equilibrium
exists, then it obtains the optimal welfare.
Case 1: Consumer 1 is superadditive, consumer 2 is subadditive (xab ≥ xa + xb, yab ≤ ya + yb).
Combining the superadditivity of consumer 1 with Eq. (12) implies that either xa <
1
3xa +
1
3yb or
xb <
1
3xa +
1
3yb. Since the first inequality contradicts the assumption that xa ≥ yb, it follows that
xb <
1
3
xa +
1
3
yb. (14)
Let pa = xa and pb =
1
3xa +
1
3yb. We claim that allocating item a to consumer 1 for a price of pa and
item b to consumer 2 for a price of pb forms a competitive equilibrium.
Consumer 1 obtains 0 utility from his allocation, so we need to show that no other allocation
gives him a strictly positive utility. The utility consumer 1 derives from item b is u1(b) = xb − pb =
xb − (13xa + 13yb), which is negative by Eq. (14). For the bundle {a, b}, it holds that
u1({a, b}) = xab − (pa + pb) < 2
3
xa +
2
3
yb − xa − 1
3
xa − 1
3
yb =
1
3
yb − 2
3
xa ≤ 0, (15)
where the first inequality follows by Eq. (12), and the last inequality follows by the assumption that
xa ≥ yb.
For consumer 2, it holds that u2(b) = yb− pb = yb− (13xa+ 13yb), which is non-negative by Eq. (13).
We next show that u2(a) < u2(b). It holds that
u2(a)− u2(b) = ya − pa − (yb − pb) ≤ yab − pa − yb + pb < 2
3
xa +
2
3
yb − xa − yb + 1
3
xa +
1
3
yb = 0,
where the first inequality follows by monotonicity (in particular, ya ≤ yab), and the second inequality
follows by substituting the payments. Finally, it holds that u2({a, b}) < 0, by the same calculation as
in (15) (replacing xab with yab). We conclude that the proposed allocation and payments constitutes a
competitive equilibrium, as promised.
Case 2: Consumer 1 is sub-additive, consumer 2 is superadditive (xab ≤ xa + xb, yab ≥ ya + yb).
The existence of a competitive equilibrium in this case is established in a similar way to case 1.
Combining the superadditivity of consumer 2 with assumption (12) implies that either yb <
1
3xa +
1
3yb
or ya <
1
3xa +
1
3yb. Since the former case contradicts Eq. (13), it follows that
ya <
1
3
xa +
1
3
yb. (16)
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Let pa =
1
3xa +
1
3yb and pb = yb. We claim that allocating item a to consumer 1 for a price of
pa and item b to consumer 2 for a price of pb forms a competitive equilibrium. For consumer 2,
u2(b) = yb − pb = 0. We show that consumer 2’s valuation for any other allocation is non-positive. For
item a, u2(a) = ya − pa = ya −
(
1
3xa +
1
3yb
)
< 0, where the last inequality follows by Eq. (16). For the
bundle {a, b}, it holds that
u2({a, b}) = yab − (pa + pb) < 2
3
xa +
2
3
yb − 1
3
xa − 1
3
yb − yb = 1
3
(xa − 2yb) ≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows by Eq. (12) and the last one follows by Eq. (13).
It remains to show that the same holds with respect to consumer 1. u1(a) = xa− pa = xa− (13xa+
1
3yb) =
2
3xa − 13yb, which is non-negative by the assumption that xa ≥ yb. For the bundle {a, b}, the
same calculations as for consumer 2 (replacing yab with xab) shows that u1({a, b}) < 0. Finally, we
show that u1(b) < u1(a). Indeed,
u1(b)− u1(a) = xb − pb − (xa − pa) ≤ xab − pb − xa + pa < 2
3
xa +
2
3
yb − yb − xa + 1
3
xa +
1
3
yb = 0,
where the first inequality follows by monotonicity and the last one follows by Eq. (12).
We conclude that it is either the case that one of the consumer derives at least 23 of the optimal
welfare from the grand bundle, or there exists an item-price competitive equilibrium, in which case the
optimal welfare is obtained. Thus, the assertion of the theorem is established.
B Missing Proofs: Preperations
Proof: [of Lemma 3.3] Fix some ǫ > 0. For every consumer i ∈ N ′ for which Si is not empty,
define a new valuation vǫi that is identical to vi except for a shift of ǫ in the value of Si, i.e., v
ǫ
i (Si) =
vi(Si) + ǫ (the new valuation may no longer be monotone). For every other consumer i simply set
vǫi = vi. Observe that the partial competitive bundling equilibrium is still a partial competitive bundling
equilibrium with respect to the vǫi ’s. Now apply Theorem 3.1 to get a bundling B′, allocation (S′1, . . . , S′n)
and prices ~p′. We show that since we started with a partial competitive bundling equilibrium, these
bundling, allocation and prices form a competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to the vǫi ’s, that
is, all bundles in B are allocated. By the latter fact and by properties (1) and (3) of Theorem 3.1,∑
i∈N vi(S
′
i) ≥
∑
B∈B pB .
To show that we get a competitive bundling equilibrium, since property (3) of Theorem 3.1 is
guaranteed, the only missing component is to show market clearance, i.e., that ∪iSi = M . Suppose
towards a contradiction that there is a bundle B ∈ B that was not allocated. Let i be the consumer
that was allocated that bundle in the partial competitive bundling equilibrium. Observe that under
the prices of the partial competitive bundling equilibrium, B is the most profitable bundle of i. Now
since B is unallocated, its price remaines the same by property (2) of Theorem 3.1, while the prices
of the other bundles can only increase by properties (1) and (2). Thus B is the most preferred bundle
for i (with valuation vi it is only a most preferred bundle), and by property (3) consumer i must be
allocated this bundle.
We would now like to show the existence of a competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to the
vi’s and not just with respect to the v
ǫ
i ’s. When taking ǫ to 0, we get an infinite sequence of allocations
and prices. Since the number of allocations is finite and since all prices are bounded between 0 and
max{maxi vi(M),maxB(pB)}, there exists a subsequence in which one allocation S˜ repeats and the
prices converge to a price vector p˜. Note that it still holds that
∑
i∈N vi(S˜i) ≥
∑
B∈B pB .
To finish the proof we now claim that this allocation S˜ and prices p˜ are a competitive bundling
equilibrium with respect to the vi’s. Observe that for every ǫ in the converging subsequence, if consumer
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i receives S˜i, then S˜i is the unique bundle that maximizes his profit; otherwise, for smaller values of
ǫ, S˜i is no longer the most profitable bundle for i in contradiction to the assumption that we have a
competitive bundling equilibrium for the vǫi ’s. Since this is true for every ǫ > 0, for ǫ = 0 we get that
S˜i is one of the most profitable bundles for i, which is enough to prove that S˜ and p˜ form a competitive
bundling equilibrium with respect to the bundling B.
Proof: [of Lemma 3.5] We will show that after applying Theorem 3.1 to the high-demand priced
bundling, all bundles in B are allocated. Assume towards contradiction there is a bundle B ∈ B that
is not allocated. Since B is unallocated its price remaines unchanged by property (2) of Theorem 3.1.
But there are at least |B| consumers for which B is profitable, hence for property (3) to hold, each of
these consumers must be allocated an alternative bundle (otherwise their profit would be 0). However,
there are only |B| − 1 bundles except for B, a contradiction.
Proof: [of Lemma 3.6] LetW =
∑
i∈N vi(Si) be the welfare of allocation S, and recall µ = min{n,m}.
We define an auxiliary allocation S′′ to be almost the same allocation as S, but without parts con-
tributing little to the total welfare: for every i ∈ N , if vi(Si) < W/2µ then set S′′i = ∅, otherwise set
S′′i = Si. The welfare does not decrease by much:
∑
i∈N
vi(S
′′
i ) ≥
1
2
W =
1
2
∑
i∈N
vi(Si).
We now partition consumers into bins as follows: put consumer i into a bin corresponding to value
v if vi(S
′′
i ) ∈ [v, 2v). Notice that by construction of S′′ it holds that ∀i : vi(S′′i ) ∈ [W/2µ,W ], and so
there are at most log(2µ) + 1 = log(µ) + 2 bins. Denote the set of consumers in the bin corresponding
to the value v by Nv. There must be some value v
∗ such that the total value of consumers in Nv∗ is
at least the overall total value
∑
i∈N vi(S
′′
i ) divided by log(µ) + 2. The proof is concluded by setting
S′i = S
′′
i for every i ∈ Nv∗ , and S′i = ∅ otherwise. Observe that the construction requires poly(m,n)
time and uses only value queries.
C Missing Proofs: Revenue
C.1 Proof of Theorem 7.1
We divide the proof of Theorem 7.1 into two parts, proving first the bound for uniform-rank functions
and then for the case where all valuations have the same matroid. We begin with a lemma that will
be useful in both parts. For this lemma we use the following notion: A competitive equilibrium with
reserve q is a competitive equilibrium in which the price of every item is at least q. Specifically, while
in a standard competitive equilibrium it is required that an item that is not sold has price 0, here an
item that is not sold has price q.
Lemma C.1 In every combinatorial market with valuations that are weighted matroid rank functions,
there exists some price q such that there exists a competitive equilibrium with reserve q that extracts
revenue of at least Ω( 1logm) of the optimal welfare.
Proof: Following a similar argument to the one developed in Lemma 3.6, there exists a value v and
an allocation O′ = (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) such that for every item j ∈ O′i, vi({j}) ∈ [v, 2v), and the welfare of O′
is a logarithmic approximation to the welfare of the optimal allocation. Let Mv =
⋃
iO
′
i be the items
allocated in O′. Then, the social welfare obtained in O′ is at most 2vMv , therefore we get
2vMv ≥ OPT/O(logm). (17)
Consider a modified market with an additional consumer n + 1 who values every item at exactly
v (i.e., additive valuation). Since an additive valuation satisfies the gross substitutes condition, this
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new market admits a competitive equilibrium. Note that every item that is allocated to one of the
original consumers (i.e., any consumer other than consumer n+ 1) has a price of at least v (otherwise
consumer n+ 1 is better off purchasing this item). Similarly, every item that is allocated to consumer
n+1 has a price of exactly v. Therefore, a competitive equilibrium in this modified market corresponds
to a competitive equilibrium with reserve v in the original market. Among all competitive equilibria
with reserve v, consider one that minimizes the number of unallocated items, and let A = (A1, . . . , An)
denote the allocation in this equilibrium.
Since the price of every allocated item is at least v, due to Equation (17) it is sufficient to show
that at least Mv items are allocated in A. Let i be a consumer for whom |Ai| < |O′i|. By the exchange
property of a matroid function, there exist |O′i|− |Ai| items that can be added to Ai, and for every such
item j ∈ O′i \Ai, it holds that vi({j}) ≥ v. We claim that these items must be allocated in A. Indeed,
if not, then the price of j is v, and since vi({j}) ≥ v it contradicts the minimality of the number of
unallocated items in A. The assertion of the lemma follows.
The last lemma essentially proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium with respect to a subset
of the items that extracts the desired revenue. The challenge is, therefore, to reallocate the unallocated
items among the original consumers in a way that preserves the profit maximization property. Note
that we need not extract any revenue from these items, since the revenue is sufficiently high even
without selling these items.
C.1.1 Proof for Uniform Matroids
Lemma C.1 establishes the existence of a competitive equilibrium with reserve v that guarantees a
logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare in revenue. Let W and p denote the allocation and prices
of such an equilibrium, and let MW ⊆ M denote the allocated items in W . In addition, we denote by
E (respectively, E¯) the consumers who exhaust (resp., do not exhaust) their ranks. i.e., E = {i ∈ N |
|Wi| = ki}. Finally, let ME and ME¯ denote the items allocated to consumers in E and E¯, respectively.
We distinguish between two cases.
Case (a): Most of the revenue of W comes from consumers in E; i.e.,
∑
j∈ME
p(j) ≥ 12 ·
∑
j∈MW
p(j).
Consider the market that contains consumers in E and the items ME . Observe that this market is
supported by a competitive equilibrium with reserve v in which all consumers exhaust their ranks
(simply allocate the bundle Wi to every consumer i ∈ E at a price of p(j)). Consider next the market
that contains the consumers in E, but all items M . We claim that this extended market also admits a
competitive equilibrium with reserve v in which all consumers exhaust their ranks. This is established
by the following claim.
Claim C.2 Consider a market with consumers with valuations that are weighted rank functions of a
uniform matroid, and a set of items M ′. Suppose this market admits a competitive equilibrium with
reserve v in which all consumers exhaust their ranks. Then, the market that contains the same set of
consumers, and a set of items M such that M ′ ⊆M , also admits a competitive equilibrium with reserve
v, in which all consumers exhaust their ranks.
Proof: Let (O1, . . . , On) be the allocation in the competitive equilibrium in the original market and
(O′1, . . . , O
′
n) be the competitive equilibrium after adding items. Recall that by the first welfare theorem
both allocations maximize the welfare in the corresponding markets.
Now observe that the optimal allocation if all valuations are rank functions of a weighted uniform
matroid, the optimal solution can be computed by finding the maximum weighted matching in a
bipartite graph where in one side every vertex corresponds to a different item, and in the other side
there are ki vertices for each consumer i with valuation of rank ki. The weight of an edge between a
vertex that corresponds to some item j and each of the vertices of consumer i has weight vi({j}).
28
Now, since one market is a subset of the other, the matching that corresponds to (O1, . . . , On) is
a valid matching in the bipartite graph that corresponds to the extended market. In particular, since
(O′1, . . . , O
′
n) is optimal for the extended market, there is a sequence of reallocation that corresponds
to augmenting paths that leads from (O1, . . . , On) to an optimal allocation with value equal to the
value of (O′1, . . . , O
′
n). Notice that by definition of augmenting paths if all the vertices in the side
that corresponds to the players where originally matched all will continue to be matched after each
augmentation. This implies that in competitive equilibrium with a minimal price v all consumers still
exhaust their ranks, as needed.
We conclude that the market with consumers in E and all itemsM admits a competitive equilibrium
with reserve v in which all consumers exhaust their ranks. Let (W ′, p′) be such an equilibrium, let
T =M \ME be the set of items that are not allocated in this equilibrium, and let imax ∈ argmaxi∈E ki
be a consumer with maximum rank among the consumers in E. We are now ready to construct a
Partial competitive bundling equilibrium with sufficiently high revenue. Bundle all items in W ′imax ∪ T
together, and allocate it to consumer imax for a price of Σj∈W ′imax
p′(j). For every other consumer
i 6= imax, bundle all items in W ′i together and allocate it to consumer i for a price of Σj∈W ′ip′(j).
We next show that this is a Partial competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to consumers in
E. For imax, it is clearly the case that W
′
imax
∪ T is the most profitable bundle, since its value only
increased and its price remained unchanged. Consider next a consumer i ∈ E other than imax. Clearly, i
prefers his bundle to every other bundle of consumers other than imax. It remains to show that i prefers
his own bundle to receivingW ′imax∪T for a price of Σj∈W ′imaxp
′(j). By the maximality of imax, consumer
imax originally consumed at least ki items, each at a price at least v. In contrast, the price of every
unallocated item was at most v. Therefore, the price of every bundle form W ′imax ∪ T of size ki or less
has either increased or remained unchanged. The price of his own allocation, however, clearly remained
unchanged. Therefore, W ′i is still the most profitable bundle for consumer i, as desired. It follows that
the above allocation and prices form a Partial competitive bundling equilibrium with revenue at least
OPT/O(logm). The proof is then concluded by invoking Lemma 3.3 to reach a competitive bundling
equilibriumwith the aforementioned revenue guarantees.
Case (b): Most of the revenue of W comes from consumers in E¯; i.e.,
∑
j∈ME¯
p(j) ≥ 12 ·
∑
j∈MW
p(j).
Let T = M \ ME¯ be the set of items that are not allocated to a consumer in E¯, and let imax =
argmaxi∈E¯ vi(Wi ∪ T ). We next construct a Partial competitive bundling equilibrium with sufficiently
high revenue. For every consumer i ∈ E¯ except for imax, bundle the items inWi and allocate this bundle
to consumer i for a price of Σj∈Wip(j). Now, let W
′
imax
= Wimax ∪ T be a bundle that contains the
items in Wimax and in T . Allocate the bundle W
′
imax
to consumer imax for a price of vimax(W
′
imax
). We
claim that this is a Partial competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to consumers in E¯. consider
first consumer imax. The utility he derives from this outcome is 0. We claim that this is the most
profitable outcome for imax. Indeed, since |Wimax | < kimax , the utility that imax derives from every
item j 6∈ Wimax under price p(j) is at most 0. Consider next consumers other than imax. By the
maximality of imax and the price assigned to W
′
imax , the utility every other consumer derives from this
bundle is at most 0. It remains to show that no consumer prefers the bundle of any other consumer
other than imax. But this follows from the fact that the allocation and prices of these bundles remained
unchanged. As before, it remains to invoke Lemma 3.3 on the partial competitive bundling equilibrium
to obtain a competitive bundling equilibrium with respect to all n consumers, whose revenue is at least
OPT /O(logm), as required.
C.1.2 Proof for Valuations Based on the same Matroid
We now prove Theorem 7.1 for markets where all valuations are based on the same matroid rank
function with possibly different weights. The proof makes use of the following definition.
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Definition C.3 (Extra-consumer solution) Suppose that all the n valuations are the rank function
of the same matroid (M,IM ) (with possibly different weights). An extra-consumer solution is an
allocation (S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1) of the items to n+ 1 bundles, an item price pj for every item j, a bundle
price pSi for every bundle Si of consumer i < n+ 1, and an additional price q, such that the following
three properties hold:
1. For every consumer i < n + 1, his profit from his bundle according to the bundle prices is at
least as high as his profit from any set of items U according to the item prices, i.e., ∀U ⊆ M :
vi(Si)− pSi ≥ vi(U)−
∑
j∈U pj.
2. For every i < n + 1, the bundle price pSi is at least as high as the price of any independent set
U ⊆ Si according to the item prices, i.e., ∀U ∈ IM s.t. U ⊆ Si : pSi ≥
∑
j∈U pj.
3. Every item j ∈ Sn+1 has the same price pj = q, and the price of every item j /∈ Sn+1 is at least
as high: pj ≥ q.
The following lemma shows how to obtain a competitive bundling equilibrium from an extra-
consumer solution. Notice that the revenue of the competitive bundling equilibrium is the revenue
from the consumers in N according to the bundle prices.
Lemma C.4 Consider an extra-consumer solution with allocation (S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1), item prices {pj}j∈M ,
bundle prices {pSi}n+1i=1 , and an additional price q. If either Sn+1 = ∅ or q = 0 then we get a competitive
bundling equilibrium as follows: the partition of items to bundles is (B1, . . . , Bn, Bn+1) where Bi = Si,
the allocation of bundles to consumers is (S1, . . . , Sn), and the bundle prices are pBi = pSi for i < n+1,
where pSi = 0 for i = n+ 1.
Proof: First note that Bn+1 = Sn+1 is the only unallocated bundle in the competitive bundling
equilibrium, and it is either empty or has price 0. Also note that since q = 0 and by property (3) of
the extra-consumer solution, we have a strengthened version of property (2), which holds not only for
every i < n+ 1, but also for i = n+ 1 when pSn+1 is set to zero.
Now assume for contradiction that there is a set of bundles T such that consumer i < n+ 1 would
prefer T to his allocation Si, i.e., vi(Si)− pSi < vi(T )−
∑
Bℓ∈T
pBℓ = vi(T )−
∑
Sℓ∈T
pSℓ (in particular,
bundle Sn+1 may belong to T ). Consider the value vi(T ). There is an independent set U ⊆ ∪Sℓ∈TSℓ
such that vi(T ) = vi(U). We get the following contradiction:
vi(T )−
∑
Sℓ∈T
pSℓ ≤ vi(U)−
∑
Sℓ∈T
∑
j∈Sℓ∩U
pj
= vi(U)−
∑
j∈U
pj
≤ vi(Si)− pSi ,
where the first inequality is by the strengthened version of property (2), and the second inequality is
by property (1) of the extra-consumer solution.
Thus, our goal is to show the existence of an extra-consumer solution, in which either Sn+1 = ∅ or
the price q is zero. In addition, we would like the revenue from the consumers in N according to the
bundle prices to be a logarithmic approximation to OPT. By Lemma C.4 this is sufficient to complete
the proof of the theorem. To prove existence we proceed iteratively; the next lemma shows the existence
of a good starting point.
Lemma C.5 There exists an extra-consumer solution whose revenue from the consumers in N accord-
ing to the bundle prices is at least OPT / log(m).
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Proof: The existence of such a solution follows directly from Lemma C.1, by augmenting the
competitive equilibrium with additive bundle prices.
We are now ready to continue the construction. We will take an extra-consumer solution with
|Sn+1| > 0 and q > 0 and produce another extra-consumer solution in which either |S′n+1| < |Sn+1| or
q′ = 0, making sure that the revenue did not decrease. Several such iterations are sufficient to complete
the proof of existence.
Denote by ~r = (r1, . . . , rn) the ranks according to the matroid (M,IM ) of the allocation (S1, . . . , Sn)
of the extra-consumer solution. We consider two cases.
Case 1 There is an item j ∈ Sn+1 and a consumer i∗ such that j can be added to Si∗ without
increasing its rank ri∗ . If this is the case, add j to Si∗ keeping the bundle and item prices fixed. So
S′i∗ = Si∗ ∪{j}, S′n+1 = Sn+1 \{j} and q′ = q. We show that the three properties of an extra-consumer
solution still hold. Property (3) holds since the item prices did not change. Property (1) holds for
i 6= i∗ since i’s profit did not change, and holds for i∗ since his profit weakly increased. Property (2)
holds for i 6= i∗ since Si did not change.
It is left to argue that Property (2) holds for i∗. Let U ⊆ S′i∗ be an independent set in IM .
Assume for contradiction that pSi∗ <
∑
j∈U pj . Since we started with an extra-consumer solution, U
must include j. Let U ′ 6= U be another independent set contained in S′i∗ such that |U ′| = |U | and
j /∈ U ′. Such an independent set is guaranteed to exist since the rank of S′i∗ did not increase despite
adding j, and is equal to the rank of Si∗ . By a well-known property of matroid independent sets,
there is an item k ∈ U ′ \ U such that j can be replaced with k and the set will remain independent,
i.e., U ′′ = U \ {j} ∪ {k} ∈ IM Schrijver [2003]. We know that pSi∗ ≥
∑
j∈U ′′ pj by property (2) of
the original extra-consumer solution. But
∑
j∈U ′′ pj = pk − pj +
∑
j∈U pj, and by property (3) of the
original extra-consumer solution, pk ≥ pj = q. Thus
∑
j∈U ′′ pj ≥
∑
j∈U pj, in contradiction to the
above assumption.
Case 2 For every item j ∈ Sn+1 and for every consumer i, adding j to Si increases the rank ri of
Si. Denote S
′
i = Si ∪ {j} and let r′i = ri + 1 be its rank. The increase in the rank means that i’s
value for his bundle goes up by his weight for j, i.e., vi(S
′
i) = vi(Si) + wij . This is by the following
argument: Clearly i’s value goes up by at most his weight for j. We know that vi(Si) = vi(U) for some
independent set U ⊆ Si, where |U | = ri. We show that U ∪ {j} remains an independent set, and so
vi(S
′
i) ≥ vi(U) + vi({j}) = vi(Si) + wij. Assume for contradiction that U ∪ {j} is not an independent
set. Then its rank r(U ∪ {j}) remains ri. Let U ′ ⊆ S′i be an independent set with size (rank) r′i. By
the exchange property of matroids, there is an item k ∈ U ′ \ U that can be added to U increasing its
rank. By our assumption, this item cannot be j. But this leads to a contradiction, since U ∪ {k} ⊆ Si,
and r(U ∪ {k}) = ri + 1.
Now let item j∗ ∈ Sn+1 and consumer i∗ be such that the contribution of j∗ to i∗ is maximum over
all items in Sn+1 and all consumers, i.e., wi∗j∗ = maxi∈N,j∈Sn+1{wij}. Notice that wi∗j∗ ≤ q, otherwise
property (1) of the original extra-consumer solution does not hold. Add j∗ to Si∗ and raise the bundle
price by wi∗j∗, i.e., set the bundle price pS′
i∗
= pSi∗ + wi∗j∗ . Set the item price of j
∗ to be pj∗ = wi∗j∗
and set q′ = wi∗j∗ as well. If q
′ < q, lower the prices of all items remaining in S′n+1 to q
′.
We now show that the three properties of an extra-consumer solution hold. Properties (2) and (3)
hold by the way we modified the bundle and item prices. We first argue that property (1) holds for
consumer i∗: His profit did not change (his value increased by wi∗j∗ but so did his bundle price). That
means that if there’s an item set U which he strongly prefers to his bundle S′i∗ , it must contain items
other than j∗ whose prices decreased. The only such items are the items in S′n+1. But since we chose j
∗
that maximizes wi∗j over all j ∈ Sn+1, then for every j ∈ S′n+1, pj = wi∗j∗ ≥ wi∗j. This contradicts the
assumption that i∗ strongly prefers U . By a similar argument, property (1) holds for every consumer
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i 6= i∗, whose profit did not change and whose value for any item with decreased price is at most the
reduced price. This concludes the analysis of the second case.
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